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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
because the judgment appealed from has been transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to
The Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether a person in possession of a property pursuant to an oral lease with

the property owner is a proper party in an action for unlawful detainer and payment of
back rents.
This is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869
P.2d. 932, 939 (Utah 1994). R. 29-30, R.47-49 R. 70-73
2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in awarding attorney's fees to
Snideman when there is no contract or written agreement between the parties providing
for the award of attorney fees in an action between the parties.
This is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869
P.2d. 932, 939 (Utah 1994). R. 48, R 53, R72-73, R 107.
3. Whether the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is sufficient to support
the judgment of the trail court?
A trial courts findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. See
Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1998). R 26-27, R47-49, R 53-55,R 69-70
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. There are no constitutional provisions
that are determinative of this appeal.
2. STATUTORY PROVISIONS. The following are statutory provisions that are
determinative of this appeal.
A. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (3). Judgment for restitution, damages,
and rent - Immediate enforcement - Treble damages

(3) The judgment shall be

entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the amount of the damages
assessed under Subsections (2) (a) through (2) (c), and for reasonable attorneys' fees, if
they are provided for in the lease or agreement.
B. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7. Necessary parties defendant. (1) No
person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is one in the actual
occupation of the premises when the action is commenced, shall be made a party
defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in Section 78-38-13 , nor shall any
proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be non-suited, for the non-joinder of any person who
might have been made a party defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties
served with process or appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be
rendered against those parties.
C. Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a). Parties plaintiff and defendant, (a) Real party in
interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An
2
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executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with whom
or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party
authorized by statute may sue in that personfs name without joining the party for whose
benefit the action is brought;
D. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Findings by the court, (a) Effect, in all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon

"

E. Utah Ct. R. Ann. § 4-505. Attorney fees affidavits.... 1. Affidavits in
support of an award of attorney fees must befiledwith the court and set forth specifically
the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney, the
number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing
the matter to the stage for which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness
of the fees for comparable legal services.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the District Court
Plaintiff Joy Pinckney ("Pinckney")filedsuit in the Fourth District Court for Utah
County against the Defendant John David Snideman ("Snideman") for unlawful detainer
and past due rents. (R. at 1-5). Pinckney's right to seek said rents arises out of an
assignment (R. 121, Exhibit 4) of an All-Inclusive Trust Deed (R. 121, Exhibit 2) and a
Trust Deed Note (R. 121, Exhibit 3). The property at issue was owned by Prodigy
3
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Enterprises, Inc., who conveyed the property as Trustor pursuant to the All-inclusive
Trust Deed to Old Republic Title Company as Trustee and in which Robin Lott ("Lott")
was the Beneficiary. Lott subsequently assigned the All-inclusive Trust Deed and the
Trust Deed Note to Pinckney. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the All-inclusive Trust Deed
provide that the Beneficiary has the right to collect all rents, including those past due and
unpaid, if the Trustor is in default. At the time Pinckney brought the action, Snideman
was in possession of the property pursuant to an oral lease with the property owner,
Prodigy Enterprises, Inc.
The trial court ruled that the proper parties were not before the court and granted
judgment to Snideman, awarding attorney fees in the sum of $3,618.00 and costs.
Pinckney filed her notice of appeal on November 1, 1999. (R. 113).
Statement of Facts
Robin Lott ("Lott") sold the property at issue to Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. (R. 120,
p.25, lines 9-10; R. 121, Exhibit 2; R. 121, Exhibit 6). Lott, as part of the consideration
for the sale of the property, took back a note for $195,000.00 secured by an All Inclusive
Deed of Trust. (R. 120, p. 25, lines 15-17). A few days afer selling the property, Lott
borrowed $20,000.00 from Pinckney and secured the loan with an assignment to
Pinckney of Lott's interests and rights in the All- Inclusive Deed of Trust and the Trust
Deed Note Lott had received from Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. (R. 121, Exhibit 1; R. 121,
Exhibit 4).
4
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Subsequently Lott defaulted in her payments to Pinckney. (R. 120, p. 16, lines 1315; R. 120, p. 26, lines 3-5). Pinckney exercised the assigned right under the Allinclusive Deed of Trust to collect rents, including those past due, from the property. (R.
120, p. 26, lines 6-12).
Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. was delinquent in its payments to Lott and notice of
default was given and the foreclosure of a trust deed proceeding was commenced and
ongoing at the time of the unlawful detainer action of the case at hand. (R. 120, p. 26,
lines 3-16).
Snideman was delinquent in his payments of rents to Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. (R.
120, p. 29, lines 3-11; R. 121, Exhibit 5). At a meeting between Lott and Snideman, held
in the office of Tretheway, the attorney for Pinckney, an accounting was made and agreed
upon showing a delinquency in rents in the sum of $6,477.00 as rent due. This agreement
was formalized in the Letter from Tretheway Law Offices (R. 121, Exhibit 5). The said
agreement also provided for future payments to be made by Snideman. (R. 121, Exhibit
5). After this meeting, Snideman failed to make further rental payments pursuant to the
agreement. (R. 120, p. 26, lines 13-16). Snideman was in possession of a portion of the
subject property (R.120, p. 39, lines 7-13) and paid rent on said property (R. 121, Exhibit
5; R. 120, p. 40, lines 1-10) pursuant to an oral lease between Snideman and Prodigy
Enterprises, Inc. Pinckney, pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the All-inclusive Trust
Deed filed suit against the person in possession of the property for Unlawful detainer and
5
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collection of rents. (R.l-5).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Pinckney's suit against Snideman for unlawful detainer was between the proper
parties. Pinckney had an assignment of rents from Prodigy Enterprises, Inc., the owner of
the property, through an assignment from Lott. Snideman, as the party in possession of
the property should be the proper defendant. The concurrent action for foreclosure should
stand completely separate from Pinckney's action for unlawful detainer and past due
rents.
There was no written agreement as between the Pinckney and Snideman providing
for attorney fees. Therefore the award of attorney fees to Snideman was completely in
error.
The law is clear that there must be Findings of Facts on all material and
substantive issues. In this case there are insufficient findings to support the judgments.
ARGUMENTS
I.

SNIDEMAN AND PINCKNEY ARE THE PROPER PARTIES IN AN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTION

Pinckney was the proper plaintiff to bring the unlawful detainer action before the
trial court. Pinckney received an assignment of Lott's interests and rights in the All
Inclusive Deed of Trust and the Trust Deed Note Lott had received from Prodigy
Enterprises, Inc. When Lott defaulted on the loan from Pinckney, Pinckney exercised her
6
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rights under the Trust Deed and collect the assignment of rents. In Paragraph 10 of the
All-inclusive Deed of Trust, upon any default by Trustor [Prodigy Enterprises, Inc.]
Pinckney had the right to "with or without taking possession of the property affected
hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profit." (R. 121, Exhibit 2).
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a) states:
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute
may sue in that personfs name without joining the party for whose benefit
the action is brought....
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a) (1999). Therefore, Pinckney, as an assignee to the All-Inclusive
Deed of Trust was a proper party.
Snideman, as the person in possession of the property in interest, should be the
proper party in an action for unlawful detainer. In Pearce v. Shurtz, the court said that
"Unlawful detainer, however, is an action to remove a tenant from possession and is
primarily against the person in possession. It is not similar to a quiet title action
wherein anyone with any interest should be joined. Neither is it similar to an action upon
the promissory note." Pearce v. Shurtz, 70 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1954) (emphasis added).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 provides:
No person other than the tenant of the premises, and subtenant if there is
one in the actual occupation of the premises when the action is commenced,
need be made a party defendant in the proceeding, except as provided in
Section 78-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be non7
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suited, for the non-joinder of any person who might have been made a party
defendant; but when it appears that any of the parties served with process or
appearing in the proceedings are guilty, judgment shall be rendered against
those parties.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-7 (1999).
It is manifest after reviewing the above law and the All-inclusive Deed of Trust,
(R. 121, Exhibit 2), the Assignment of the Trust Deed, (R. 121, Exhibit 4) and the Letter
from Tretheway Law Offices (R. 121, Exhibit 5) that Snideman, and not Prodigy
Enterprises, Inc., is the proper party in an unlawful detainer action. Snideman was the
real party in interest as defined by the above cited code and pursuant to the law in the
Schurtz.
In the Letter from Tretheway Law Offices (R.121, Exhibit 5) wherein Snideman
admits rent is owed, Snideman signed individually, and not in his capacity as President of
Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. The letter contains the terms, amount Snideman paid and the
balance owing always refer to rents. The Letter from Tretheway Law Offices (R.121,
Exhibit 5) and testimony found at R. 120, p. 39, lines 7-13 and R. 120, p. 54, lines 5-9,
support the conclusion that Snideman was in possession of the property and delinquent in
payment of the rent to Prodigy Enterprises Inc. Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. was unable to
make payments on the note to Lott due to the failure of the tenant Snideman to make his
rent payments to the Corporation.
Pinckney had the right to sue the tenant pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the

8
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All-inclusive Deed of Trust, therefore, Pinckney and Snideman were the proper parties
before the court.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN AWARDING
ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT A CONTRACT OR
WRITTEN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES PROVIDING FOR
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES.

The court in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken stated that "attorney fees are awardable
only if authorized by statute or by contract. 764 P.2d. 985, 988 (Utah 1988). The
applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10, states:
Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent - Immediate enforcement Treble damages
3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant
for the rent, for three times the amount of the damages assessed under
Subsections (2) (a) through (2) (c), and for reasonable attorneys' fees, if
they are provided for in the lease or agreement.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (1999) (Emphasis added). Thus, before attorney's fees can
be awarded, the court must find that the agreement between the parties provides for the
award of attorney's fees.
In the instant case, the record is void of any evidence of an agreement, lease or
writing between Pinckney and Snideman providing for the award of attorney's fees. In
fact, the court is so indefinite in the Findings of Fact that it is not known which provision
in the All-inclusive Deed of Trust (R. 121, Exhibit 2) and/or the Trust Deed Note (R.
121, Exhibit 3) Snideman relies upon to be awarded attorney's fees. Further, neither of
9
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these documents is a lease or an agreement between Pinckney and Snideman, as required
by statute.
It is also possible, but unclear, that the trial court awarded attorney's fees on the
theory of third party beneficiary. If this is the case, then Wardley Corp. v. Welch, 962
P.2d 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), is determinative. In Wardley, the plaintiff cross-appealed
the trial court's denial of its request for attorney's fees. The plaintiff had requested
attorney's fees on the theory of a third party beneficiary. The court stated that "attorney
fees authorized by contract are awardable only in accordance with the explicit terms of
the contract and only to the extent permitted by the contract." Id. at 92; see also Maynard
v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 451 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996)
(holding that the party requesting an award of attorney's fees under a contract must show
that the contract's provisions contemplate that award.)
For a third party to enforce a contractual right granting attorney's fees, it must be
shown that the contract intended to benefit the third party. See Rio Algom Corp. v.
JIMCO, Ltd, 618 P.2d 497, 506 (Utah 1980) ("For a third-party beneficiary to have a
right to enforce a right, the intention of the contracting parties to confer a separate and
distinct benefit upon the third party must be clear."). And where the contract is specific
on the issue, the terms of the contract must be followed. See Wardley, 962 P.2d at 92.
In view of these cases, Snideman should not be entitled to attorney's fees based on
the contracts between Lott and Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. Snideman refers to the All10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Inclusive Deed of Trust (R. 121, Exhibit 2) and the Deed of Trust Note (R. 121, Exhibit
3) as the basis for his claim for attorney's fees. The All-inclusive Deed of Trust (R. 121,
Exhibit 2), immediately after the assignment of rents provision in paragraph 11, refers to
attorney's fees in paragraphs 12. It states:
Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time
without notice, either in person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed
by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as
such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the
indebtedness hereby secured enter upon and take possession of said
property or any part there of, in its own name sue for or otherwise collect
said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and
apply the same, less costs and expenses of operation and collection,
including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness hereby, and in
such order as Beneficiary may determine.

R. 121, Exhibit 2.
It is clear from the wording that this paragraph does not confer any benefit on
Snideman. The reference to attorney's fees is for the sole purpose of showing what
deductions an assignee of rents is entitled to before applying the rent collected to the
indebtedness due the Beneficiary from the Trustor. There is no intent to confer a benefit
upon Snideman.
As stated in Maynard, "Those requesting an attorney fees award under a contract
must show that the contract's provisions contemplate that award." Maynard, 912 P.2d at
451. The record is void of evidence supporting any finding or conclusion that a third
party benefit was to be conferred on a tenant.
11
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The only provision in the Trust Deed Note regarding attorney's fees is as follows:
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of
principal or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and
severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including a
reasonable attorney's fee.

R. 121, Exhibit 3.
Clearly this provision applies only to a collection on the note and does not
provide for attorney's fees for an action for collection of rents. Again, applying the law
as stated above, Snideman has failed to give any evidence showing the parties to the
promissory note intended to confer a benefit upon Snideman for payment of attorney's
fees..
Further, there is insufficient proof to comply with Utah Ct. R. Ann. § 4-505.
The rule states:
Attorney fees affidavits.... 1. Affidavits in support of an award of
attorney fees must be filed with the court and set forth specifically the legal
basis for the award, the nature of the work performed by the attorney, the
number of hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment
Utah Ct. R. Ann. § 4-505 (1999). Even if Snideman were to be entitled to attorney's
fees, the document submitted and labeled an Affidavit of Attorney Fees (R. 59) fails to
comply with the law as set forth in the above rule. The document is not notarized and
therefore is not an affidavit; the affidavit does not set forth the legal basis of the award for
attorney fees as required; and the nature of the work performed by the attorney is not

12

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stated with specificity as required. Further there is no rule or case that allows one to
collect postage and copying as court costs.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial courts award of attorney's fees
because there is no written agreement between the Snideman and Pinckney providing for
attorney fees, Snideman is not a third party beneficiary, and Snideman failed to file a
notarized document that complies with the Utah Courts Rule 4-505.
III.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
TRIAL COURT'S RULING.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides that "in all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law thereon

" Utah appellate courts "consistently stress" the

importance of adequate findings of fact." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991). Finding of Fact 1 and 8 are conclusions of law and not findings of fact. (R.
108-110). The remaining findings are inadequate and will not allow the Appellate Court
to come to a proper decision as to the conclusions and Order of the court.
An award of attorney's fees must be based on the evidence and supported by
findings of fact. See Salmon v.Davis Co., 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996) (quoting
Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992)). In In re Estate ofQuinn,
784 P.2d 1238, 1249 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court states, "The absence in the record
before us of findings and conclusions of law on the issue of attorney fees compels us to
13
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remand to the trial court to correct that deficiency."
In the instant case there are no Findings of Fact as to the issue of whether and
under what theory Snideman can be awarded attorney's fees. Thus, it is not necessary for
the Appellant to marshall the evidence.
CONCLUSION
The Appellate Court should reverse the order which is the subject of review on the
basis of manifest error on each of the three issues raised. Further the court should rule as
to the issue of attorney fees being granted as it would be a necessary issue in the case if
remanded.

DATED this 30 day of March, 2000

/r>

ichard L. Trethew^y
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of A l l : OF UTAH

99OCT27 P/JI2..5

W

Thomas J. Klc, Attorney for Defendant
4725 South Holladay Boulevard #110
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5402
Bar Number #1836
Telephone Number (801) 277-3033
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PROVO DEPARTMENT
JOY PINCKNEY,

I FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiff I
OF LAW
vs.
Civil No. 9804-5816

JOHN DAVID SNIDEMAN
Defendant .
•

Judge Davis (assigned judge)
Judge Merrill Herinansen (trial judge)

BY THE COURT:
PURSUANT TO NOTICE, and upon Plaintiffs request for an expedited hearing, a bench trial o
the above entitled matter was heard March 9, 1999, before the Honorable Judge Merrill Herinansen,
Senior Judge. The Honorable Judge Merrill Herinansen, Senior Judge heard such matter pursuant to the
request of the Presiding Judge Steven L. Hansen pursuant to Article Vlll, Sec 4, Utah Constitution, Rul<
11-201 (2) (d) Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, and Rule 3-108 (4) Code of Judicial
Administration. Both parties, with attorney Richard L. Tretheway appearing for Plaintiffand attorney
Thomas J. Klc appearing for Defendant were present and participated in the proceedings. The court
listened to testimony, received evidence, heard argument and made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order and directed Defendant's attorney, Thomas J. Klc, to prepare a written Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law along with an accompanying Order. Plaintiff objected to the proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Pursuant to Notice and by acquiescence of the parties, a
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hearing on such objections was heard by the Court before Judge Hermansen via a telephonic confereiu
call between the Court, attorney Tretheway, and attorney Klc, whereby all participants could hear one
another. After discussion, the court directed the filing of an affidavit as to Attorney's fees by Defenda
and revision of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, giving Plaintiff twenty (20) days to objec
to the same, if at all, before execution. Following is such revision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The real party in interest in this matter, rather than Defendant John David Snideman is a
corporation named Prodigy Enterprises, Inc.

2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Utah County, the subject property is situate in
Utah County, and the activities giving rise to the litigation occurred in Utah County, Sta
of Utah.

3.

Prodigy Enterprises, Inc. is the signatory to an all-inclusive Trust Deed dated March 1,
1998 with Robin 13. Lott and an All-inclusive Trust Deed Note of the same dale. Such
Trust Deed was assigned by Robin Lott to Joy Pinckney, Plaintiff, to secure a Promissoi
Note in the amount of $20,000.00 from said Robin Lott to Plaintiff Joy Pinckney. The
property over which the dispute giving rise to this action is the property that is subject tc
such Trust Deed.

4.

Robin Lott became delinquent in payment of the note to Plaintiff Joy Pinckney. In the
instant case, Plaintiff has sought to obtain possession of the subject properly and recover
damages for non-payment along with costs and attorney's fees from Defendant John
David Snideman, a named officer of the corporation, Prodigy Enterprises, Inc.,
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No entry of default has been made in the instant case.
Plaintiffs attorney has represented that a non-judicial foreclosure of the subject trust d
is proceeding outside of the present action.
The subject All-inclusive Trust Deed Note and All Inclusive Trust Deed provide for at
least one parly to recovery attorney's fees.
The reasonable attorney's fees to be awarded Defendant in this matter is the sum of
$4/118:03CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this action. Venue is
proper.
Issues about obligations owed, if any, is more properly resolved in the foreclosure actio
Under Section 78-27-56.5, the Court may award attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
The unlawful detaitier claim, if any, should be denied. Defendant should be awarded its
costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.
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Thomas J. Klc, Attorney for Defendant
4725 South Holladay Boulevard #110
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5402
Bar Number #1836
Telephone Number (801) 277-3033

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
PROVO DEPARTMENT
JOY PINCKNEY,

ORDER
Plaintiff
Civil No. 9804-5816

vs.
JOHN DAVID SN1DEMAN
Defendant

Judge Davis (assigned judge)
Judge Merrill Hermansen (trial judge)

BY THE COURT:
A bench trial of the above entitled matter was heard March 9, 1999, before the Honorable Judge
Merrill Hermansen, Senior Judge. The Honorable Judge Merrill Hermansen, Senior Judge heard such
matter pursuant to the request of the Presiding Judge Steven L. Hansen pursuant to Article VIII, Sec 4,
Utah Constitution, Rule 11-201 (2) (d) Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, and Rule 3-108
(4) Code of Judicial Administration. On July 1, 1999, a subsequent hearing by telephonic conference call
regarding the proposed findings was heard. Based upon the record and its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the Court enters its Order as follows:
1.

Defendant is granted judgment in the above-entitled case, with prejudice, denying
Plaintiffs claim with Plaintiff taking nothing thereby.

2.
Dated

Defendant is awarded its costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee of $4,418.03.
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By the Court:
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